000 02250nam a2200361 i 4500
001 CR9781009189644
003 UkCbUP
005 20240906181744.0
006 m|||||o||d||||||||
007 cr||||||||||||
008 210920s2022||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020 _a9781009189644 (ebook)
020 _z9781009189651 (paperback)
040 _aUkCbUP
_beng
_erda
_cUkCbUP
050 4 _aUC260
_b.S65 2022
082 0 4 _a355.6212
_223
100 1 _aSmith, Ron,
_d1946 September 2-
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aDefence acquisition and procurement :
_bhow (not) to buy weapons /
_cRon P. Smith.
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2022.
300 _a1 online resource (74 pages) :
_bdigital, PDF file(s).
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
490 1 _aCambridge elements. Elements in defence economics,
_x2632-332X
500 _aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 22 Jun 2022).
520 _aThe acquisition and procurement of major weapons systems is fraught with difficulties. They tend to be delivered late, over budget and unable to meet requirements. This Element provides an economic analysis of why this happens. Market structure, demand by the military and supply by the arms firms, shapes the conduct of the agents and generates the poor performance observed. The military are trying to counter an evolving threat, subject to a budget constraint, high R&D costs and new technologies. The interaction between a government made up of warring tribes and arms firms with considerable market and political power is further complicated by a set of what economists call 'principal-agent' problems, which are examined. While the poor performance has prompted many countries to propose reforms, the difficulty of the task and the institutional incentives faced by the actors mean that the reforms rarely solve the problem.
650 0 _aArmed Forces
_xProcurement.
650 0 _aDefense industries
_xEconomic aspects.
776 0 8 _iPrint version:
_z9781009189651
830 0 _aCambridge elements.
_pElements in defence economics ,
_x2632-332X.
856 4 0 _uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009189644
942 _2ddc
_cEB
999 _c9119
_d9119