000			03563nam a2200361 i 4500
001			9780191844324
003			UK-OxUP
005			20240216142729.0
006			m|||||o d
007			cr |||||||||||
008			220902s2022||||enk|||||o|||||||||||eng|d
020			_a9780191844324 _qelectronic book _z9780198806745 _qprint
040			_aUK-OxUP _beng _cUK-OxUP _erda _epn
050	0	0	_aK3150 _b547
082	0		_a340
100	1		_aTierney, Stephen _eauthor
245	1	0	_aThe Federal Contract _bA Constitutional Theory of Federalism _helectronic _cStephen Tierney
246	0		_aThe Fed Contract
250			_aFirst Edition
264		1	_aOxford _bOxford University Press _c2022
300			_a340 p _bAll black and white images
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aOxford scholarship online
500			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aContents: 1. The Federal Contract – 2. Reconceiving Federalism – 3. The Foundations of Federalism – 4. Sovereignty and the Monist Constitution – 5. Authority and the Federal Constitution – 6. The Subjects of Federalism – 7. The Purpose and Principles of Federalism – 8. Federal Constitutional Design I: Recognition and Autonomous Government – 9. Federal Constitutional Design II: Associational Government and Reciprocity – 10. Dynamics: Changing Federal Constitutions – 11. Federalism: A Constitutional Idea for our Time – Bibliography – Index
520	3		_aFederalism is a very familiar form of government, deployed by constitution-makers to manage diverse polities at various key stages in the history of the modern state. Despite its pervasiveness in practice, federalism has been strangely neglected by constitutional theory, tending to be subsumed within one default account of modern constitutionalism or treated as an exotic outlier—a sui generis model of the state rather than a form of constitutional ordering for the state. This neglect is both unsatisfactory in conceptual terms and problematic for constitutional practitioners, obscuring the core meaning, purpose, and applicability of federalism as a specific model of constitutionalism with which to organise territorially pluralised and demotically complex states. In fact, the federal contract represents a highly distinctive order of rule which requires a particular, ‘territorialised’ approach to core constitutional concepts: constituent power, the nature of sovereignty, subjecthood and citizenship, the relationship between institutions and constitutional authority, patterns of constitutional change, and ultimately the legitimacy link between constitutionalism and democracy. In rethinking the idea and practice of federalism, this book adopts a root and branch recalibration of the federal contract. It does so by analysing federalism through the conceptual categories which characterise the nature of modern constitutionalism: Foundations, Authority, Subjecthood, Purpose, Design, and Dynamics. This approach seeks to explain and in so doing revitalise federalism as a discrete, capacious, and adaptable concept of rule that can be deployed imaginatively to facilitate the deep territorial variety of so many states in the twenty-first century.
650	0	0	_aconstitutional theory, constitutional law _xfederalism, federal government
776	0	8	_iPrint Version _z9780198806745
830		0	_aOxford Academic
856	4	0	_3Oxford Academic _uhttps://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198806745.001.0001
999			_c7839 _d7839