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008			190205s2019 nyu fob 001|0|eng|d
020			_a9780190469801 (ebook) : _cNo price
040			_aStDuBDS _beng _cStDuBDS _erda _epn
050		0	_aHB846.8 _b.O84 2019
082	0	4	_a302.13 _223
245	0	4	_aThe Oxford handbook of public choice. _nVolume 2 / _cedited by Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt.
246	3	0	_aPublic choice
264		1	_aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c2019.
300			_a1 online resource.
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aOxford handbooks online
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0	0	_tHow should votes be cast and counted? / _rNicolaus Tideman -- _tChoosing voting rules in the European Union / _rBěla Plechanovovâa, Madeleine O. Hosli, Anatolij Plechanov -- _tLeviathan, taxation, and public goods / _rMartin C. Mcguire -- _tFiscal powers revisited: the Leviathan Model after 40 years / _rGeoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt -- _tAre There Types of Dictatorship? / _rRonald Wintrobe -- _tAre there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance / _rAlejandro Quiroz Flores -- _tThe coup: competition for offices in authoritarian regimes / _rToke Aidt, Gabriel Leon -- _tThe logic of revoluions: Rational choice perspectives / _rTimur Kuran, Diego Romero -- _tDirect democracy and public policy / _rJohn Matsusaka -- _tPolicy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems / _rSebastian M. Saiegh -- _tThe significance of political parties / _rMichael Munger -- _tVoters and representatives: How should representatives be selected? / _rThomas Braendle, Alois Stutzer -- _tThe least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance / _rGeorg Vanberg -- _tChallenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy / _rStefan Voigt, Jerg Gutmann -- _tThe Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution / _rStanley L. Winer -- _tThe politics of central bank independence / _rJakob DeHaan, Sylvester Eijffinger -- _tThe Political Economy of Redistribution Policy / _rLuna Bellani, Heinrich Ursprung -- _tPolitical participation and the welfare state / _rRainald Borck -- _tInstitutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design / _rPaul Dragos Aligica, Michael E. Cox -- _tRational Ignorance and Public Choice / _rIlya Somin -- _tDivided government: the king and the council / _rGeorge Tridimas -- _tIs government growth inevitable? / _rRandall G. Holcombe -- _tThe political economy of international organizations / _rAxel Dreher, Valentin F. Lang -- _tThe politics of international trade / _rWilfred J. Ethier, Arye L. Hillman -- _tPolitics, direct investment, public debt, markets and the shadow economy / _rFriedrich Schneider -- _tThe politics of international aid / _rHristos Doucouliagos -- _tIs democracy exportable? / _rPierre Salmon -- _tAncient Greece: democracy and autocracy / _rRobert K. Fleck, F. Andrew Hanssen -- _tChristian history and public choice / _rMario Ferrero -- _tVoting at the U. S. Constitutional Convention / _rKeith L. Dougherty -- _tBicameralism / _rCecilia Testa -- _tInstitutions for amending constitutions / _rCristina Bucur, Bj²rn Erik Rasch -- _tPrecursors to public choice / _rIain McLean -- _tEstimates of the spatial voting model / _rChristopher Hare, Keith T. Poole -- _tThe dimensionality of parliamentary voting / _rKeith T. Poole -- _tVoting and popularity / _rGebhard Kirchgèassner -- _tDetection of election fraud / _rSusumu Shikano, Verena Mack -- _tExperimental public choice: Elections / _rAaron Kamm, Arthur Schram -- _tExecutive Veto Power and Constitutional Design / _rNicholas R. Miller -- _tExperimental Evidence on Expressive Voting / _rJean-Robert Tyran, Alexander K. Wagner -- _tFederalism / _rJaroslaw Kantorowicz -- _tPolitics and the legal system / _rLee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn, Jeffrey A. Segal -- _tConstitutional review / _rNuno Garoupa -- _tConstitutional transitions / _rZachary Elkins -- _tElectoral systems in the making / _rDaniel Bochsler.
520	8		_aThe two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 2 covers constitutional political economy and applications of public-choice models to various policy areas. Part V has chapters on the architecture of governance, the theory of dictatorship, and the effects of the institutions of governance. Part VI discusses the politics of public policy, international public choice, public choice and history, and measurement issues. The volume touches on topics such as taxation, redistribution, federalism, and monetary policy. It ends with discussions of various methodological approaches, including extensions of the core models to account for altruism and trust, and overviews of measurement and estimation issues, and the use of experiments in public-choice research.
521			_aSpecialized.
588			_aDescription based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on February 5, 2019).
650		0	_aSocial choice.
700	1		_aCongleton, Roger D., _eeditor.
700	1		_aGrofman, Bernard, _eeditor.
700	1		_aVoigt, Stefan, _eeditor.
776	0	8	_iPrint version : _z9780190469771
830		0	_aOxford handbooks online.
856	4	0	_3Oxford handbooks online _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.001.0001
999			_c6465 _d6465