000			03505nam a2200553 i 4500
001			9781474202756
003			CaBNVSL
005			20240311155440.0
006			m o d
007			cr cn|||||||||
008			200423s2020 enk ob 101 0 eng d
020			_a9781474202756 _q(ebook)
020			_a1509904441 _q(electronic book)
020			_z9781509904440 _q(PDF)
020			_z9781849466066 _q(print)
020			_z1849466068 _q(print)
024	7		_a10.5040/9781474202756 _2doi
035			_a(OCoLC)1152283016
035			_a(CaBNVSL)mat74202756
040			_aYDX _beng _erda _cCaBNVSL _dCaBNVSL
050	0	0	_aK290 _b.A856 2020eb
082	0	0	_a340/.1 _223
100	1		_aAsgeirsson, Hrafn, _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe nature and value of vagueness in the law / _cHrafn Asgeirsson.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_aLondon [England] : _bHart Publishing, _c2020.
264		2	_a[London, England] : _bBloomsbury Publishing, _c2020
300			_a1 online resource (216 pages).
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aLaw and Practical Reason
505	0		_a1. Authority, Communication and Legal Content -- 2. On the Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law -- 3. Vagueness and Power Delegation in Law -- 4. Vagueness, Uncertainty and Behaviour -- 5. On the Possibility of Non-literal Legislative Speech -- 6. Textualism, Content and Interpretation -- 7. Resolving Cases of Vagueness -- 8. Legal Practice and Theories of Vagueness.
506			_aAbstract freely available; full-text restricted to individual document purchasers.
520			_a"Lawmaking is - paradigmatically - a type of speech act: people make law by saying things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined by what lawmakers communicate. However, what they communicate is sometimes vague and, even when it is clear, the content itself is sometimes vague. This monograph examines the nature and consequences of these two linguistic sources of indeterminacy in the law. The aim is to give plausible answers to three related questions: In virtue of what is the law vague? What might be good about vague law? How should courts resolve cases of vagueness? It argues that vagueness in the law is sometimes a good thing, although its value should not be overestimated. It also proposes a strategy for resolving borderline cases, arguing that textualism and intentionalism – two leading theories of legal interpretation – often complement rather than compete with each other.-- _cProvided by publisher.
532	0		_aCompliant with Level AA of the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines. Content is displayed as HTML full text which can easily be resized or read with assistive technology, with mark-up that allows screen readers and keyboard-only users to navigate easily
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
650		0	_aLaw _xInterpretation and construction.
650		0	_aLaw _xPhilosophy.
650		0	_aVagueness (Philosophy)
650		7	_aJurisprudence & philosophy of law _2bicssc
655		0	_aElectronic books.
776	0	8	_cOriginal _z1849466068 _z9781849466066 _w(OCoLC)902021583
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781849466066
830		0	_aLaw and Practical Reason.
856	4	0	_3Abstract with links to full text _uhttps://doi.org/10.5040/9781474202756?locatt=label:secondary_bloomsburyCollections
975			_aHart Publishing 2020
999			_c10445 _d10445