000			02839nam a2200385 i 4500
001			CR9781009047609
003			UkCbUP
005			20240301142640.0
006			m|||||o||d||||||||
007			cr||||||||||||
008			210208s2021||||enk o ||1 0|eng|d
020			_a9781009047609 (ebook)
020			_z9781316517833 (hardback)
020			_z9781009048491 (paperback)
040			_aUkCbUP _beng _erda _cUkCbUP
050	0	0	_aK3289 _b.T848 2021
082	0	0	_a342/.04 _223
100	1		_aTushnet, Mark V., _d1945- _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe new fourth branch : _binstitutions for protecting constitutional democracy / _cMark Tushnet, Harvard Law School.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2021.
300			_a1 online resource (ix, 186 pages) : _bdigital, PDF file(s).
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
490	1		_aComparative constitutional law and policy
500			_aTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 23 Aug 2021).
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Why a fourth branch - the structural logic -- Why a fourth branch - the functional logic -- Design issues in general -- Design principles in practice - A survey -- Anticorruption investigations - Case studies from Brazil and South Africa -- Electoral commissions - Case Studies from India, the United States, and South Korea -- Audit agencies -- Conclusion.
520			_aTwenty-first-century constitutions now typically include a new 'fourth branch' of government, a group of institutions charged with protecting constitutional democracy, including electoral management bodies, anticorruption agencies, and ombuds offices. This book offers the first general theory of the fourth branch; in a world where governance is exercised through political parties, we cannot be confident that the traditional three branches are enough to preserve constitutional democracy. The fourth branch institutions can, by concentrating within themselves distinctive forms of expertise, deploy that expertise more effectively than the traditional branches are capable of doing. However, several case studies of anticorruption efforts, electoral management bodies, and audit bureaus show that the fourth branch institutions do not always succeed in protecting constitutional democracy, and indeed sometimes undermine it. The book concludes with some cautionary notes about placing too much hope in these - or, indeed, in any - institutions as the guarantors of constitutional democracy.
650		0	_aConstitutional law.
650		0	_aSeparation of powers.
650		0	_aIndependent regulatory commissions.
776	0	8	_iPrint version: _z9781316517833
830		0	_aComparative constitutional law and policy.
856	4	0	_uhttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781009047609
999			_c10078 _d10078