Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).

Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; List of Figures and Tables; Acknowledgments; 1 Weak and Strong States in Historical Perspective; 1.1. Fiscal Fundamentals; 1.2. The Approach; 1.3. Overview of Contents; 2 Gaining Force; 2.1. The Fragmented Old Regime; 2.2. Quantitative Analysis; 2.2.1. Research Design; 2.2.2. Results; 2.3. Centralization after 1789; 2.4. Coding Centralization; 3 Restricting Power; 3.1. Predatory Kings; 3.2. The Fiscal Supremacy of Parliament; 3.3. Coding Limited Government; 4 Political Regimes and Credit Risk; 4.1. Regimes and Risk: Theory; 4.2. The Data.

4.3. Regimes and Risk: Case-Study Evidence; 4.3.1. France; 4.3.2. The Netherlands; 4.3.3. Spain; 5 Two Mechanisms; 5.1. Regimes, Revenues, and Prudence: Theory; 5.2. The Data; 5.3. Regimes, Revenues, and Prudence: Case-Study Evidence; 5.3.1. France; 5.3.2 The Netherlands; 5.3.3. Spain; 5.3.4 Austria; 5.4. Prussia as an Anomaly; 6 Letting the Data Speak for Themselves; 6.1. Structural Breaks Basics; 6.2. Sovereign Credit Risk: Results; 6.3. Two Mechanisms: Results; 7 Estimating the Fiscal Effects of Political Regimes; 7.1. Econometric Basics; 7.1.1. Panel Specification.

7.1.2. Accounting for Conflict, Growth, and Other Factors; 7.1.3. Reverse Causation?; 7.2. Sovereign Credit Risk: Results; 7.3. Two Mechanisms: Results; 7.3.1. Government Revenues; 7.3.2. Deficit Ratios; 8 The Institutional Balance of Modern Fiscal States; 8.1. Assessment of Findings; 8.2. The Changing Role of Government; 8.3. Historical Lessons for Development; 8.4. The Future of Entitlements; Appendices; Works Cited; Index; Other Books in the Series.

How did today's rich states first establish modern fiscal systems? To answer this question, Political Transformations and Public Finances by Mark Dincecco examines the evolution of political regimes and public finances in Europe over the long term. The book argues that the emergence of efficient fiscal institutions was the result of two fundamental political transformations that resolved long-standing problems of fiscal fragmentation and absolutism. States gained tax force through fiscal centralization and restricted ruler power through parliamentary limits, which enabled them to gather large tax revenues and channel funds toward public services with positive economic benefits. Using a novel combination of descriptive, case study and statistical methods, the book pursues this argument through a systematic investigation of a new panel database that spans eleven countries and four centuries. The book's findings are significant for our understanding of economic history and have important consequences for current policy debates.