The Oxford handbook of public choice. Volume 2 /
Public choice
edited by Roger D. Congleton, Bernard Grofman, and Stefan Voigt.
- 1 online resource.
- Oxford handbooks online .
- Oxford handbooks online. .
Includes bibliographical references and index.
How should votes be cast and counted? / Choosing voting rules in the European Union / Leviathan, taxation, and public goods / Fiscal powers revisited: the Leviathan Model after 40 years / Are There Types of Dictatorship? / Are there really dictatorships? The Selectorate and authoritarian governance / The coup: competition for offices in authoritarian regimes / The logic of revoluions: Rational choice perspectives / Direct democracy and public policy / Policy differences among parliamentary and presidential systems / The significance of political parties / Voters and representatives: How should representatives be selected? / The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance / Challenges in Estimating the Effects of Constitutional Design on Public Policy / The Political Economy of Taxation: Power, Structure, Redistribution / The politics of central bank independence / The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy / Political participation and the welfare state / Institutions for Solving Commons Problems: Lessons and Implications for Institutional Design / Rational Ignorance and Public Choice / Divided government: the king and the council / Is government growth inevitable? / The political economy of international organizations / The politics of international trade / Politics, direct investment, public debt, markets and the shadow economy / The politics of international aid / Is democracy exportable? / Ancient Greece: democracy and autocracy / Christian history and public choice / Voting at the U. S. Constitutional Convention / Bicameralism / Institutions for amending constitutions / Precursors to public choice / Estimates of the spatial voting model / The dimensionality of parliamentary voting / Voting and popularity / Detection of election fraud / Experimental public choice: Elections / Executive Veto Power and Constitutional Design / Experimental Evidence on Expressive Voting / Federalism / Politics and the legal system / Constitutional review / Constitutional transitions / Electoral systems in the making / Nicolaus Tideman -- Běla Plechanovovâa, Madeleine O. Hosli, Anatolij Plechanov -- Martin C. Mcguire -- Geoffrey Brennan, Hartmut Kliemt -- Ronald Wintrobe -- Alejandro Quiroz Flores -- Toke Aidt, Gabriel Leon -- Timur Kuran, Diego Romero -- John Matsusaka -- Sebastian M. Saiegh -- Michael Munger -- Thomas Braendle, Alois Stutzer -- Georg Vanberg -- Stefan Voigt, Jerg Gutmann -- Stanley L. Winer -- Jakob DeHaan, Sylvester Eijffinger -- Luna Bellani, Heinrich Ursprung -- Rainald Borck -- Paul Dragos Aligica, Michael E. Cox -- Ilya Somin -- George Tridimas -- Randall G. Holcombe -- Axel Dreher, Valentin F. Lang -- Wilfred J. Ethier, Arye L. Hillman -- Friedrich Schneider -- Hristos Doucouliagos -- Pierre Salmon -- Robert K. Fleck, F. Andrew Hanssen -- Mario Ferrero -- Keith L. Dougherty -- Cecilia Testa -- Cristina Bucur, Bjòrn Erik Rasch -- Iain McLean -- Christopher Hare, Keith T. Poole -- Keith T. Poole -- Gebhard Kirchgèassner -- Susumu Shikano, Verena Mack -- Aaron Kamm, Arthur Schram -- Nicholas R. Miller -- Jean-Robert Tyran, Alexander K. Wagner -- Jaroslaw Kantorowicz -- Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin Quinn, Jeffrey A. Segal -- Nuno Garoupa -- Zachary Elkins -- Daniel Bochsler.
The two volume Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the Public Choice literature. Volume 2 covers constitutional political economy and applications of public-choice models to various policy areas. Part V has chapters on the architecture of governance, the theory of dictatorship, and the effects of the institutions of governance. Part VI discusses the politics of public policy, international public choice, public choice and history, and measurement issues. The volume touches on topics such as taxation, redistribution, federalism, and monetary policy. It ends with discussions of various methodological approaches, including extensions of the core models to account for altruism and trust, and overviews of measurement and estimation issues, and the use of experiments in public-choice research.